Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

2019

Reinvigorating the Perceived Potential
Competition Theory: An Analysis of the Potential
Competition Doctrine and FTC v. Steris Corp.
Henry S. Klimowicz

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Klimowicz, Henry S., "Reinvigorating the Perceived Potential Competition Theory: An Analysis of the Potential Competition
Doctrine and FTC v. Steris Corp." (2019). Law School Student Scholarship. 978.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/978

REINVIGORATING THE PERCEIVED POTENTIAL COMPETITION THEORY: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE AND FTC V. STERIS CORP.
Henry S. Klimowicz*
ABSTRACT
Basic economic theory states that markets and consumers are usually best served when there
is vigorous competition in a free market, with competitors battling over price and quality. For this
reason, antitrust law recognizes the preservation of competition as its primary goal.1 During the
1960s and 1970s, 2 antitrust enforcement agencies responded to an increase in merger activity by
challenging many transactions under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 3 The newly recognized potential
competition doctrine was an effective legal tool upon which the agencies relied in non-horizontal
merger cases before the Supreme Court. It has been 43 years since the Supreme Court last ruled on
a potential competition case, however, and their less-than-clear-precedent on the subject has led to
lower courts crafting difficult and inconsistent standards. In FTC v. Steris, a district court in Ohio
recently rejected the government’s potential competition argument, finding that a merger between
two of the largest firms in the already concentrated contract sterilization industry4 did not violate
Section 7. Despite being the only sub-theory under the potential competition doctrine endorsed by
the Supreme Court, the FTC did not argue its case under the perceived potential competition theory.
Instead, the decision hinged on a single element under the actual competition theory—a sub-theory
with higher evidentiary burdens and no explicit Supreme Court approval. Unsurprisingly, the court
concluded that the FTC did not carry their evidentiary burden under the actual potential competition
theory. It is unclear why the FTC chose not to raise the perceived potential competition doctrine. If

* J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. Gettysburg College. I would like to thank Professor Marina
Lao for the inspiration to write this Comment, and for her guidance throughout my research and writing of such. I would
also like to thank my parents, Doris and Bob Klimowicz, as well as my ciocia and uncle, Quiche and Richard Stone, for
all of their unwavering love and support.
1
Mission, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/mission (last visited Apr. 10, 2018) (“The goal of the antitrust
laws is to protect economic freedom and opportunity by promoting free and fair competition in the marketplace.
Competition in a free market benefits American consumers through lower prices, better quality and greater choice.
Competition provides businesses the opportunity to compete on price and quality, in an open market and on a level playing
field, unhampered by anticompetitive restraints. Competition also tests and hardens American companies at home, the
better to succeed abroad.”).
2
See generally, Thomas M. Hurley, The Urge to Merge: Contemporary Theories on the Rise of Conglomerate Mergers
in the 1960s, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 185 (2006).
3
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). Section 7 of the Clayton Act deems a merger or acquisition unlawful if it may “substantially
lessen competition.” Id. The Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice are the two main federal agencies
who file antitrust challenges.
4
The contract sterilization industry consists of companies that contract with manufacturers to rid their products of
unwanted microorganisms. See FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 963-64 (N.D. Ohio 2015).
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agencies continue to forgo this theory, however, the sustained allowance of non-horizontal mergers
will pose new threats to US markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
As industries become more concentrated, consumers are increasingly threatened by the
prospect of monopolistic behavior due to the reduction of competition. 5 Antitrust enforcement
agencies seek to prevent this occurrence by prohibiting certain merger or acquisition transactions that
may have this effect; however, these transactions can provide significant procompetitive benefits.6
A merger, for instance, may benefit consumers and markets by augmenting innovation and
efficiencies among the participating firms. 7 But when these transactions occur in concentrated
markets, they pose enhanced risks to competition.8 Congress addressed this concern long ago by
passing the Clayton Act in 1914, as amended by the Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950.9
Section 7 of the Clayton Act (Section 7) deems mergers and acquisitions unlawful where the
effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”10 Congress
conferred enforcement authority of Section 7 to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and
Department of Justice (DOJ).11 Section 7 not only covers mergers between competitors in the same
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See generally, Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin, & Roni Michaely, Are US Industries Becoming More Concentrated?,
(August 31, 2017) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2612047 (“More than 75% of US industries have
experienced an increase in concentration levels over the last two decade. . . . In real terms, the average publicly-traded
firm is three times larger today than it was twenty years ago. Lax enforcement of antitrust regulations and increasing
technological barriers to entry appear to be important factors behind this trend. Overall, our findings suggest that the
nature of US product markets has undergone a structural shift that has weakened competition.”).
6
Competition Guidance for Antitrust Law, FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
7
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §10,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf (explaining the benefits that merger
transactions can provide) (“Nevertheless, a primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate
significant economic efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may result
in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.”) [hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES].
8
Concentrated markets are harmful for competition and the DOJ recognizes this. See 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 7, at 18–19.
9
The original Clayton Act only prohibited the acquisition of “stock.” 15 U.S.C. §18. The Celler-Kefauver Act amended
the Clayton Act so it included horizontal mergers. Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1225.
10
15 U.S.C. §18
11
Todd N. Hutchison, Understanding the Differences Between the DOJ and FTC, A.B.A.: YOUNG LAW. DIVISION,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/understanding_differen
ces.html (“The DOJ and FTC share authority to enforce the Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman Act.). See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 21, 25. Each agency typically takes the lead in reviewing mergers within certain industries to enforce Section 7 of the
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market (“horizontal” mergers), but also those effectuated by non-competitors in different markets
(“non-horizontal” mergers).12 Historically, “potential competition” was a doctrine raised in cases
involving non-horizontal mergers. 13 Today, it is also a concept that can be pertinent in horizontal
mergers.14
Antitrust enforcement agencies, the Supreme Court, and a handful of circuit courts have
recognized the role that the potential competition doctrine plays in preserving competition. 15
Agencies often seek to protect competition under the potential competition doctrine, in both the future
and present, by respectively employing the actual potential competition theory and the perceived
potential competition theory when arguing a non-horizontal merger case.16
The Supreme Court, however, has only adopted the perceived potential competition theory.
Still, the country’s highest judicial body has not made it easy for the FTC to succeed. It has been
over forty years since the Court has last ruled on such a case,17 and antitrust law has since shifted
towards a more defendant-friendly agenda. 18 Consequently, lower courts have taken it upon
themselves to craft different and often heightened standards under the doctrine. 19 This has

Clayton Act. Id. § 18. Although there may be some overlap, the DOJ and FTC tend to allocate merger reviews according
to their respective expertise. For example, the DOJ typically investigates mergers in the Financial Services,
Telecommunications, and Agricultural Industries; the FTC typically investigates mergers in the Defense, Pharmaceutical,
and Retail Industries.
12
Note that Non-Horizontal Mergers are now included within the same umbrella as “Horizontal Mergers” under the
newest DOJ guidelines. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7.
13
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1985) (separate
designations between “non-horizontal” mergers and “horizontal mergers) [hereinafter 1985 GUIDELINES]; but see
2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7 (where all mergers are viewed under the category of “horizontal mergers.”).
14
See 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7.
15
See generally, Ernest H. Schopler, “Doctrine of Potential Competition as Basis for Finding Violation of § 7 of Clayton
Act,” (15 U.S.C.A. § 18), 44 A.L.R. Fed. 412.
16
Id. at 2. The actual potential competition doctrine seeks to prevent the removal future economic benefit, whereas the
perceived potential competition doctrine seeks to preserve present economic benefits. See also, 1985 GUIDELINES, supra
note 13.
17
The last Supreme Court ruling on a potential competition case was in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.,
418 U.S. 602 (1974).
18
See generally, GELLOHRN, ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, 453 (stating that antitrust enforcement agencies
shifted to loose enforcement after the institution of the merger guidelines in the 1980’s).
19
See Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa, Rethinking the Potential Competition Doctrine, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1035, 1058
(2007) (“It is unsurprising then to find that lower courts have only contributed to the confusion in this area by creating a
number of different and conflicting factors to evaluate claims that the acquisition of a potential competitor will violate
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substantially detracted from the FTC’s ability to prioritize which types of firms deserve the title of
“potential competitor.”
This comment will first lay out the rationale and history underlying the potential competition
doctrine. It will conclude by focusing on a recent lower court ruling in FTC. v. Steris Corporation in
order to highlight the doctrine’s high evidentiary burdens. Thus, Part II will first attempt set forth a
comprehensible explanation of the potential competition doctrine. Part III will then address the
Supreme Court cases on the doctrine and analyze the Court’s shift in standards under the perceived
potential competition theory. The latter portion of this argument will focus on the Steris decision,
and argue that the FTC may have increased its chances of success had it relied on the perceived
potential competition theory rather than the actual potential competition theory.
II. THE POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE: THE PERCEIVED POTENTIAL
COMPETITION THEORY AND THE ACTUAL POTENTIAL COMPETITION THEORY
A. The Potential Competition Doctrine, Generally.
The Potential Competition Doctrine addresses mergers between non-competitors, which are
commonly referred to as “non-horizontal mergers.”20 Although less susceptible to antitrust scrutiny
than “horizontal mergers” (those between competitors),21 agencies still recognize the negative effects
that non-horizontal mergers can pose on competition.22 Specifically, agencies address the future

section 7. Worse still, in some cases, the courts appear to have disregarded what little guidance the Supreme Court has
provided them. And, many courts have become very skeptical of such claims entirely.”).
20
Id. at 1081, n.355 (“In affirmative cases asserting the potential competitor doctrine, the 1984 Guidelines remain in
force. As the DOJ and FTC explained upon the release of the 1992 Guidelines: ‘guidance on non-horizontal mergers is
provided in Section 4 of the Department’s 1984 Merger Guidelines, read in the context of today’s revisions to the
treatment of horizontal mergers.’”) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Statement Accompanying Release of Revised
Merger Guidelines (Apr. 2, 1992), reprinted in ABA Antitrust Section, The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines:
Commentary and Text 21, 22 (1992)).
21
See Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines Sec. 4, Department of Justice (“Although non-horizontal mergers are less likely
than horizontal mergers to create competitive problems, they are not invariably innocuous.”).
22
1985 GUIDELINES, supra note 13 (“Non-horizontal mergers involve firms that do not operate in the same market. It
necessarily follows that such mergers produce no immediate change in the level of concentration in any relevant market
. . . . [N]on-horizontal mergers are less likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive problems . . . . In some
circumstances, the non-horizontal merger of a firm already in a market with a potential entrant to that market may
adversely affect competition.”).
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effects a merger may have on competition by employing the actual potential competition theory.23
Generally, this theory states that the transaction removes the possibility that the two firms would have
competed within the same market in the future. 24 When arguing a potential competition case,
agencies often also seek to protect the present procompetitive effects a non-horizontal merger may
threaten by employing the perceived potential competition theory.25 This theory states that a given
transaction may remove present-procompetitive influences that the acquired firm has on the target
market, which stems from the target market’s perceptions of the acquired firm’s ability to enter the
target market.26 Thus, the sub-theories’ anticompetitive effects respectively stem from whether the
acquired firm had an actual or perceived ability to enter the acquiring firm’s market.
At first glance, these two theories may seem complex and intimidating—especially for those
not familiar with antitrust law.27 In order to alleviate some of this confusion, this Comment will now
further explain the basic rationale and frameworks underlying these two theories—and specifically,
why their convoluted legal substance has broad implications for agencies when bringing a potential
competition case.
1. The Actual Potential Competition Theory: An Objective Standard
Consider Outback Steakhouse (Outback), a business that largely competes with other sitdown restaurants within the casual dining market.28 Outback thus resides on the edge of the drive-

Bush & Mass, supra note 19, at 1046 (“The competitive effect from actual potential competition occurs in the future.”).
Id.
25
Id. (stating, “When the transaction or conduct is aimed at a potential competitor that is constraining market prices or
having some other current, ongoing procompetitive effect, courts apply the perceived potential competition doctrine. For
example, courts find that perceived potential competition is present when competitors in a highly concentrated market
are aware of the potential competitor and have adjusted their pricing in a more competitive manner to perhaps deter that
firm’s entry.”).
26
Id. See generally, William E. Dorigan: The Potential Competition Doctrine: The Justice Department’s Antitrust
Weapon under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. (1975).
27
Even for those who are familiar with antitrust law, the theory still tends to garner confusion. See Bush & Massa, supra
note 19, at 1089 (stating, “The language of the tests set out in the 1984 Guidelines and the 1992 Guidelines also creates
some confusion . . . .”).
28
See The Boulder Group, The Net Lease Casual Dining Market Report (Q1 2017),
http://bouldergroup.com/media/pdf/2017-Q1-Net-Lease-Casual-Dining-Research-Report.pdf.pdf (listing financial
statistics about Outback Steakhouse and other restaurants within the “casual dining market,” such as Hooters, Chili’s,
and Red Lobster).
23
24
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through fast-food market since their business models are in close proximity.29 Now, imagine that
Outback is financially capable of expanding into the fast-food market, and is intent on doing so
because of the high prices that fast-food restaurants charge. Executives at McDonald’s recognize this
probable expansion by Outback, and begin to fear that the move will detract from McDonald’s own
sales by making its market more competitive. In effort to avoid any future competition with Outback,
McDonald’s takes the low-road initiative and successfully initiates a merger agreement with
Outback.30 As a result, instead of having a new competitor in the fast-food market (which would
likely pressure the fast-food giants to lower prices), the fast-food market ends up with a larger, more
powerful McDonald’s—a firm that can continue to charge high prices. This example attempts to
neatly portray why antitrust law and federal agencies have used the actual potential competition
theory to challenge certain non-horizontal mergers that seem to remove the possibility of lower prices
in the future.
Now apply the previous hypothetical to a more formalized definition: the actual potential
competition theory is premised on the notion that the acquired firm (Outback) may produce future
procompetitive benefits in the acquiring firm’s market (drive through fast-food market) if it were not
for the merger. 31 In other words, the actual potential competition theory seeks to prevent nonhorizontal mergers, where transactions involve an acquired firm that is “likely” to soon enter the
acquiring firm’s market. 32 Thus, agencies use the actual potential competition theory to target
For purposes of this Comment, “close proximity” means that the two markets are somewhat similar. “Market
proximity,” however, is a legal term that attempts to portray the similarity of markets in objective terms. Joseph F.
Brodley, The Potential Competition Doctrine Under the Merger Guidelines, 71 CAL. L. REV. 376, 389–401 (1983)
(“Proximity is determined by: (1) the similarity between the two markets in terms of critical entry characteristics, such as
production, marketing, technology, and transactional relations; and (2) actual observed entry between the two markets,
or from the outside market into a market closely similar to the inside market. If according to these criteria the proximity
between markets is close, it can be presumed that the acquiring firm has an entry advantage.”).
30
Scienter on the part of McDonald’s is not required under the actual potential competition theory; however for the sake
of this example, consider that such is present.
31
See Donald F. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1362–86
(1965). This author actually endorses the actual competition theory, however, also discusses how many critique the
theory as well.
32
Id. This may be done by either “de novo entry,” where a firm independently enters a market, or by “toe hold
acquisition,” where a firm acquires a small firm in the market in order to gain entry.
29
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transactions that involve acquired firms, which have the actual ability and intent to enter the market
of the acquiring firm, prior to the merger.33
These types of transactions raise red flags for antitrust agencies. In their joint guidelines, the
FTC and DOJ state: “By eliminating the possibility of entry by the acquiring firm in a more
procompetitive manner, the merger could result in a lost opportunity for improvement in market
performance resulting from the addition of a significant competitor.”34
Make sense? Well, in the context of Section 7, the Supreme Court is unsure. The country’s
highest judicial body has not adopted the theory35 and as a result, neither have all federal courts.36
This widespread absence of approval is largely due to the commonly-held view that the theory is
inconsistent with plain-reading interpretations of Section 7.37 Namely, critics claim that since the
language of Section 7 prohibits only mergers that threaten to reduce present competition, the law
should not bar mergers that take away the potential for increased competition in the future.38 Still,
the theory has garnered lower court approval on account that enforcement agencies consistently raise
it in the cases they bring.39 Therefore, many courts adjudicate actual potential competition issues, 40

33

Id.
1985 GUIDELINES.
35
See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
36
The Eighth Circuit has approved of the doctrine, as have the Seventh and Tenth Circuits. Other circuits, including the
First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and District of Columbia have not decided the issue. A number of lower courts have utilized
the doctrine in hearing Section 7 challenges to mergers (2-10 Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers Sec. 10.02).
37
On its face, Section 7 does not require a company to take the action most likely to make a market more competitive;
Section 7 simply proscribes certain acts that may substantially decrease competition. Another objection to the actual
potential competition theory is that if market forces are to be relied on to create consumer satisfaction, the presumption
should be that the decision of a firm to enter a market by merger is the best and most efficient choice. See Corporate
Acquisitions & Mergers. See also Turner, supra note 31, at 1362–86.
38
See, e.g., DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF ANTITRUST 235 (1972); Stanley D. Robinson, Recent
Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 243 (1975); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282,
323–24 (1975); but see, Donald F. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV.
1313, 1383 (1965) (“[T]here is a rather modest case for prohibiting a merger between a firm that would clearly enter the
market by internal expansion and a leading or growing established firm in a tight oligopoly.”)
39
See FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (acknowledging that although the Supreme Court has
not endorsed the actual potential competition doctrine, it will be accepted by the Court because the FTC recognizes its
validity).
40
E.g., id.
34
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albeit in the absence of clear Supreme Court precedent.41 This is problematic for lower courts that
adjudicate actual potential competition issues since these courts are seemingly free to develop their
own standards without pushback.42
The only potential guidance influencing lower court standards stems from statements the
Supreme Court gave in dicta.43 In United States v. Marine Bancorporation, the Supreme Court stated
that three essential preconditions must be met if an argument concerning the actual potential
competition theory were to prevail:
(i)

The target market must be concentrated;

(ii)

The acquiring firm must have feasible means for entering the market

other than by making the challenged acquisition, that is, by de novo entry or entry by
foothold or toe hold acquisition;44 and
(iii)

those means must offer a substantial likelihood of ultimately

producing deconcentration of that market or other significant precompetitive
effects.45
Following the Court’s holding in Marine Bancorporation, many lower courts have still
remained skeptical of the actual potential competition doctrine, since the Court ultimately failed to
endorse the theory outright.46 Some of these lower courts, however, have heightened element two—
the theory’s hallmark element—specifically, by requiring the FTC to show by “certain proof” that
the acquired firm was likely to enter the acquiring firm’s market.47

41

The Supreme Court has addressed the actual potential competition doctrine, but just has not endorsed it. See Marine
Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602. Therefore, the Supreme Court has not explicitly approved a framework or analysis for
the actual potential competition doctrine.
42
Bush & Mass, supra note 19.
43
See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
44
This is the element of issue in FTC v. Steris which will be discussed in Part V & VI.
45
Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 633.
46
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
47
See Federal Trade Com. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 549 F.2d 289, 293–95 (4th Cir. 1977).
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2. The Perceived Potential Competition Theory
In the context of the Outback example, companies within the fast-food market are vigilant of
other companies, like Outback, that reside on the edge of the drive-through fast-food industry. It
logically follows that McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and Burger King want to avoid potential competition
with new fast-food chains. In an effort to dissuade Outback from believing that its transition will be
profitable, the fast-food chains will subsequently constrain the prices of their food. Preserving this
pre-emptive, procompetitive behavior of target market firms is the goal of agencies under the
perceived potential competition theory.48
The perceived potential competition theory recognizes that by simply residing “in the wings”
of the fast-food industry, Outback can exert a present-procompetitive influence on the fast-food
market without ever entering.49 Compared to the actual potential competition theory, the benefits on
competition the perceived potential competition theory seeks to preserve may exist notwithstanding
the possibility that (1) Outback may not actually intend on ever entering the fast-food market, or (2)
Outback may not even be financially capable of entering the target market to begin with.50 Rather,
the beneficial effect the theory seeks to preserve is dependent on (1) whether firms in the target market
(McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and Burger King) subjectively perceive Outback as a company that may
enter, and (2) if that perception has a present-procompetitive effect on their behavior in the form of
lower prices.51

48

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
See Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 625.
50
See Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1046 (“[C]ourts find that perceived potential competition is present when
competitors in a highly concentrated market are aware of the potential competitor and have adjusted their pricing in a
more competitive manner to perhaps deter that firm’s entry.”).
51
Id.
49
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Courts refer to this effect as “the wings effect,”52 “the fringe effect,” and “the edge effect.”53
But unlike the actual potential competition doctrine, the Supreme Court has endorsed the perceived
potential competition doctrine as a valid legal principle.54 Still, however, few courts have barred
mergers on perceived potential competition grounds.55
The 1985 Merger Guidelines include a more formalized explanation of the theory’s
underlying rationale, in addition to the potential anticompetitive effects of such a merger:
By eliminating a significant present competitive threat that constrains the behavior of
the firms already in the market, the merger could result in an immediate deterioration
in market performance. The Economic theory of limit pricing suggests that
monopolists and groups of colluding firms may find it profitable to restrain their
pricing in order to deter new entry.56
Under the Marine Bancorporation framework, to successfully invoke the perceived potential
competition doctrine, the FTC must show that: (i) the acquired firm has the “characteristics,
capabilities, and economic incentives to render it a perceived potential entrant de novo; (ii) the target
market is substantially concentrated; and (iii) the acquired firm’s premerger presence on the fringe
of the target market in fact tempted oligopolistic behavior of firms operating in that market.57 A
fourth prerequisite, given in a later Supreme Court case, requires that there are few other potential
entrants.58

52

Id.
See United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976).
54
See United States v. El Paso 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
55
See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir.
1972), United States v. First Nat’l State Bancorporation, 499 F. Supp. 793 (D.N.J. 1980); United States v. Phillips
Petroleum Corp., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1234; 1254–56 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff’d mem. sub nom. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United
States, 418 U.S. 906 (1974), reh’g denied, 419 U.S. 886 (1974); In re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174, 1273
(1979), aff’d sub nom. Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981); In re Polypore Int’l, Inc., 2010 FTC
LEXIS 97, at *72 n.41 (2010), concurring opinion at 2010 FTC LEXIS 96 (2010), aff’d, 686 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2853 (U.S. 2013).
56
See 1985 GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at [page]. The theory of perceived potential competition relies on the general
notion that firms in existing markets wish to avoid competition, and are pressured to keep their prices low by firms they
perceive as potential entrants. The preservation of this present competitive benefit is the underlying goal of the perceived
potential competition doctrine.
57
See Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 624-25.
58
See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 534 n.13 (1973). This requirement is usually bundled with
element three, because if there are many potential entrants, the perceptions of the acquired firm, specifically, will likely
not have much of an effect on the target market.
53
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III.

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
COMPETITION DOCTRINE

AND THE

ENDORSEMENT

OF THE

PERCEIVED POTENTIAL

The potential competition doctrine was first recognized as a legitimate legal tool for antitrust
enforcement in 1964 with the Supreme Court’s rulings in United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.
and United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co.59 The historical milieu surrounding antitrust law during
this period is significant in that mostly all of the following cases were adjudicated during the 1960s
and 1970s—a period marked by enhanced merger activity. 60 Recognizing a spike in merger
transactions, antitrust enforcement agencies adopted aggressive anti-merger policies.61 The rationale
applied by the Court in the following two cases therefore portrays an economic perspective that
presumed harm to competition when faced with transactions occurring in concentrated markets.62
Today, however, enforcement policies are reluctant to make such an assumption as the legal
landscape surrounding mergers is more defendant-friendly.63
United States v. El Paso was the first Supreme Court case to address the perceived potential
competition theory.64 In El Paso, the merging firms were both large players who sold gas in different
Northwest states.65 The acquiring firm, El Paso Natural Gas Co. (El Paso), was the only out-of-state
supplier in California.66 El Paso agreed to acquire Pacific Northwest Pipeline (Pacific) after Pacific’s

59

United States v. El Paso 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
See supra note 2.
61
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION, The Development of Antitrust Enforcement, http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-ofrights-in-action/bria-23-1-c-the-development-of-antitrust-enforcement.html.
62
See “Detecting and Reversing The Decline in Horizontal Merger Enforcement,” Baker & Shapiro (2008) (arguing that
merger enforcement during this time was overly stringent due to inflexible standards which relied on the “structural
presumption” of harm to competition from increasing market concentration)
63
See generally, GELLOHRN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, 453 (discussing the shift to loose enforcement after the
institution of the merger guidelines in the 1980s).
64
El Paso, 376 U.S. at 655.
65
Id. at 653.
66
Id. at 652 & n.2. (stating that El Paso also supplied fifty percent of the state’s natural gas).
60
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tentative plan to deliver oil in this state was terminated.67 Prior to the merger, Pacific Northwest was
eager to enter the California market but had not yet proven successful.68
The Supreme Court barred the acquisition on potential competition grounds, but the opinion
did not explicitly mention the potential competition doctrine by name.69 Still, the Court accepted the
DOJ’s argument that the merger was capable of substantially lessening competition since Pacific was
a “potential supplier” to the California market.70 The Court established a vague test for determining
whether the transaction harmed competition, stating that that “[t]he effect on competition in a
particular market through [the] acquisition of another company is determined by the nature or extent
of that market and by the nearness of the absorbed company to it, that company’s eagerness to enter
that market, its resourcefulness, and so on.”71
Applying this test, the Court determined that Pacific Northwest was a potential competitor
that had a present-procompetitive effect on the California market. 72 Although not yet within the
California market, the Court determined that Pacific was a potential entrant since El Paso was the
only out-of-state supplier to California, and because Pacific Northwest was “the only other important
interstate pipeline west of the Rocky Mountains.”73
In its reasoning, the Court foreshadowed the driving principles behind the perceived potential
competition theory. The Court emphasized that the purpose of Section 7 was “to arrest the trend
toward concentration, the tendency to monopoly, before the consumer's alternatives disappeared
through merger . . . .”74 The Court also noted that the natural gas industry was extremely regulated
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at the time, meaning that there were high barriers of entry for new entrants.75 The Court concluded
its opinion by stating: “We would have to wear blinders not to see that the mere efforts of Pacific
Northwest to get into the California market, though unsuccessful, had a powerful influence on El
Paso’s business attitudes within the State.” 76 Thus, the most influential aspect was the fact that
Pacific Northwest had regularly attempted to enter the California market through the submission of
bids, which had a consequential effect on El Paso’s business decisions—notwithstanding the fact that
none of Pacific Northwest’s bids were successful.77
In United States v. Penn-Olin, the Court expanded the applicability of the potential
competition doctrine.78 Prior to the joint venture, Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation, (Pennsalt) had
not yet distributed its sodium-chlorate product in a growing south eastern market.79 Olin Mathieson
Chemicals Corporation (Olin), a producer of similar chemicals, agreed to serve as a distributor for
Pennsalt’s product in the south eastern market after the companies formed a joint venture.80 There
had been no entry into this heavily concentrated market in over a decade, but each company had
independently considered entering prior to their agreement.81
The Supreme Court held that the lower court erred in applying the potential competition
doctrine by only considering, “as a matter of probability [whether] both companies would have
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entered the market as individual competitors if Penn-Olin had not been formed.”82 The Supreme
Court held that the district court should have analyzed the precise effect that the other firm would
have had on the market if only one of them had entered.83 In other words, the Court noted that the
district court should have gauged whether there would have been a wings effect if only one of the
companies had decided to enter the south eastern market. Realizing that this effect was too difficult
to gauge, the Court concluded that the agreement did not violate Section 7.84 The Court, however,
still determined that both companies could be considered potential competitors.85 This conclusion
was based on the companies’ resources, their diverse product lines, their compelling reasons to enter
the market, their respectable reputations, and their “know-how” as established companies of how to
effectively enter a new market.86
The Court’s decision in Penn-Olin is important when considering the type of firm that might
pose the most anticompetitive risks when analyzing the perceived potential competition theory.87
Specifically, the Court stated: “the existence of an aggressive, well-equipped and well financed
corporation engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter an
oligopolistic market would be substantial incentive to competition which cannot be
underestimated.”88
The previous cases both recognize an important proposition under the perceived potential
competition theory. Namely, that (1) courts should endeavor to gauge the effects a potential
competitor has by residing on the wings of a given market, and (2) a showing of the acquiring firm’s
intent to enter the market of the acquired firm is extremely relevant when gauging if the perceived
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potential competition theory should apply.89 The Court’s holding a few years later demonstrates why
actual intent of acquired firms is not dispositive when determining whether present procompetitive
benefits exist.
In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., the Supreme Court ultimately barred Procter & Gamble’s
(Procter) acquisition of Clorox on perceived potential competition grounds.90 Procter was a producer
and distributor of a wide variety of household cleaning items, which did not include bleach, prior to
the proposed acquisition.91 Clorox, the acquired firm, was an exclusive manufacturer of bleach and
controlled fifty percent of an extremely concentrated industry.92
The lower court found that Procter was not a potential competitor since it had no intent, nor
had made any past attempt to enter the bleach market.93 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that
Procter was a potential competitor in the liquid bleach market despite its finding that Procter had not
evidenced any intent to enter. 94 The Court made this conclusion based largely on Procter’s
advantageous positioning in the adjacent, household cleaning-product market. 95 Probative to the
Court’s finding that Procter was the “most likely entrant” to the liquid bleach market were the facts
that Procter sold similar goods, was engaged in a program to diversify its product lines, had
substantial advantages in advertisement and merchandising, retained experienced managers who
marketed similar goods, and could feasibly build an efficient plant at a reasonable cost.96 The Court
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also found that Procter had acquired Clorox for the purpose of gaining a greater share of the market
than it could have attained had it entered independently.97
The Court also placed heightened importance on the plethora of potential anticompetitive
effects the merger could have had if effectuated. It stated that (1) removing Procter from the market
would eradicate the present procompetitive effects that Procter had on the liquid bleach market by
waiting in the wings, 98 and (2) that the acquisition would deter new entry among smaller firms
considering entering the liquid bleach market since they would not want to compete with the larger,
newly merged Procter.99
Six years later, the Supreme Court gave a more complete analysis of the perceived potential
competition doctrine, in United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.100 In Falstaff, the United States
challenged a merger between Falstaff Brewing Company and Narragansett Brewing Company. 101
Prior to the merger, Falstaff was one of the ten largest brewing companies in the United States.102
Falstaff had not sold its products in the New England market prior to the merger, but publicly
expressed interest in doing so on multiple occasions. 103 Instead of eventually entering de novo,
however, Falstaff decided to purchase Narragansett—a company that held a twenty percent share of
the New England market.104

97

386 U.S. at 581.
Id. at 581. The Court determined that Procter, in fact, had an effect on the market behavior of participants in the liquid
bleach industry since it viewed Procter as one that might begin producing bleach. The Court, however, did not gauge the
price effect that would arise from the elimination of Procter as a perceived potential entrant. Id.; see also United States
v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.78 U.S. 158 (1964) (finding that doing so was impossible).
99
386 U.S. at 581; see Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1053 (stating the acquisition might discourage smaller firms
considering entering the market, or already on the fringe). In stating that “few firms would have the temerity to challenge
a firm as solidly entrenched as Clorox,” the Court suggested that smaller firms will have even fewer incentives to enter a
market dominated by an established incumbent (Clorox) that is owned by a large conglomerate with significant resources
(Procter). Thus, the Court reasoned that the transaction would create, or increase, barriers to entry in the bleach market
for smaller firms, perhaps significantly limiting the number of perceived potential entrants to only larger firms. See 386
U.S. at 578.
100
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 551.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 528 (stating that this twenty percent market share was expected to increase).
98

17

The government employed the potential competition doctrine and argued that the transaction
may substantially lessen competition in the New England market because: (1) Falstaff was a
“potential entrant” and (2) the acquisition eliminated competition that would have existed had Falstaff
entered the market de novo. 105 The district court rejected this contention and permitted the
transaction, reasoning that Falstaff could not successfully enter the New England market de novo or
through a toe-hold acquisition; it had to be by the acquisition of a larger brewery already in the region,
such as Narragansett.106
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court did not rely on the finding that Falstaff lacked
the actual capability of successfully entering the market on its own. Rather, the Court reinforced its
holding in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., and stated that the district court had, “failed to give separate
consideration to whether Falstaff was a potential competitor in the sense that it was so positioned on
the edge of the market that it exerted beneficial influence on competitive conditions in that market.”107
Specifically, the Supreme Court insisted that such an inquiry should be centered not on the internal
decisions of Falstaff executives, but on whether, “given its financial capabilities and conditions in the
New England market, it would be reasonable to consider [Falstaff] a potential entrant into that
market.”108 The Court ultimately remanded the decision to the lower court to determine whether
Falstaff could be said to influence existing competition as a potential competitor on the fringe of a
market.109
Considering that the lower court already found that Falstaff was incapable of entering
independently,110 this case shows the importance the Supreme Court gives to showings of a wings
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effect when posed with arguments under perceived potential competition theory. Thus, in both
Falstaff and Procter, the Court did not narrowly focus on whether a firm is likely to enter a market
but for the merger. Instead, in both cases, the Court corrects the lower courts for their failure to
consider whether the firm in question had a present procompetitive influence on the target market.111
In the following case, however, the Court shifts its position under the perceived potential competition
theory, and proffers heightened standards under both of the potential competition doctrine’s subtheories.112
In Marine Bancorporation, the United States challenged a proposed merger between two
commercial banks.113 The Court ultimately prohibited the acquiring firm from engaging in a market
it decided not to enter de novo.114 The acquiring bank, National Bank of Commerce (NBC), was a
large bank based in Seattle and owned a subsidiary of the appellee, Marine Bancorporation.115 This
firm was the second largest bank in the state, but had not yet been able to compete directly in the
Spokane metropolitan area.116 The acquired firm, Washington Trust Bank (WTB), was a smaller
bank in Spokane.117
The government argued that the proposed merger violated Section 7, and argued its case under
both sub-theories.118 Under the actual potential competition theory, the government first argued that
the merger would eliminate the possibility of market deconcentration in the future since NBC could
enter the Spokane market without a merger.119 Under the perceived potential competition doctrine,
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the government argued that NBC’s perceived presence on the fringe of the Spokane market had
present procompetitive effects.120
Without endorsing the actual potential competition theory,121 the Court stated in dicta that if
the government were to succeed under this theory, “two essential preconditions must be met[:] . . . (i)
that in fact NBC has available feasible means for entering the Spokane market other than by acquiring
WTB; and (ii) that those means offer a substantial likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration
of that market or other significant procompetitive effects.”122 Under the first prong, the Court found
that state law barriers precluded NBC from establishing a branch bank in Spokane de novo,123 and
concluded that that the only means that NBC could enter the target market was through merger.124
Under the second prong, the Court acknowledged that it is conceivable under state law that NBC may
have been able to acquire smaller banks within Spokane but determined that state law limitations on
NBC’s ability to grow those entities rendered any likely procompetitive effects de minimis.125
Since the Court also rejected the government’s perceived potential competition argument,126
the Marine Bancorporation case further highlights the high evidentiary burdens that the FTC faces
when arguing potential competition cases. The government attempted to show that NBC was a
perceived potential entrant that exerted present-procompetitive effects on the Spokane market by
offering subjective evidence in the form of a memorandum written by an NBC officer.127 The Court,
however, dismissed this evidence by stating that the opinions of officers of the acquiring bank, and
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not the target bank, did not establish a violation of Section 7. 128 The Court instead applied an
objective standard when gauging fringe effect, and stated that since “rational bankers” in Spokane
were aware of the regulatory barriers that rendered NBC an unlikely or insignificant entrant except
by merger, “[i]t is improbable that NBC exerts any meaningful procompetitive influence over
Spokane banks by ‘standing in the wings.’” 129 After an economic review of the market and
concluding that no fringe effect was evident, the Court used objective evidence pertaining to entry
barriers in order to make a subjective determination concerning firm perception.130
IV.

THE PERCEIVED POTENTIAL COMPETITION THEORY POST-MARINE BANCORPORATION: A
SUBJECTIVE STANDARD?
Admittedly, the FTC’s case in Marine Bancorporation was not strong. The agency was not

able to proffer any legitimate subjective evidence which neatly showed target firm perception, nor
was it able to objectively show, through economic data, that NBC had a fringe effect on banks in
Spokane.131 Still, however, the Marine Bancorporation case is important in the Court’s focus away
from the future anticompetitive effects of a merger, like in Procter and Falstaff. 132 Ultimately,
however, the Court’s use of an objective standard when gauging fringe effect undermines any
incentive to use the perceived potential competition doctrine.
Thus, Marine Bancorporation essentially requires that acquired firms, such as Outback in the
prior hypothetical, be actually capable of entering the acquiring firm’s market, regardless of whether
the company is already exerting procompetitive influences, or whether the target market is overly
concentrated. This standard is puzzling, in that the present-procompetitive effects—the focus of the
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perceived potential competition doctrine—stem from subjective perceptions rather than actual
capabilities.
The objective standard the Court gives in Marine Bancorporation essentially equates the
perceived potential competition theory to the actual potential competition theory by requiring that
the acquired firm actually be able to enter. 133 This issue is ultimately most noticeable when
considering the following case: where evidence shows that the target market perceives the acquired
firm as a perceived potential entrant, but where objective evidence of such perception (i.e., through
economic data concerning fringe effect) cannot be tied to those perceptions. This risks the possibility
that any present-procompetitive effects an acquired firm has on a target market will not be fleshed
out and confirmed through objective evidence, despite overwhelming subjective evidence that
evinces the contrary.
Naturally, lower courts have struggled in creating consistent standards for determining
whether a “wings effect” exists. 134 The Supreme Court in Marine Bancorporation appeared to
require direct evidence of such.135 Lower courts, however, most namely those in the Second Circuit,
are more lenient. 136 The Second Circuit requires only “at least circumstantial evidence” that the
fringe presence “probably directly affected competitive activity in the market,” and does not compel
plaintiffs to proffer any direct evidence of procompetitive effects in the form of direct economic
data.137 Other lower courts have even assumed that a fringe effect exists based on a showing of
certain objective factors.138 Again, the Second Circuit’s more lenient standard under this analysis is
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more conducive to preserving the economic benefits that may be had under the perceived potential
competition theory.
In order to understand why the objective Marine Bancorporation standard seems inconsistent
with the basic premise of the perceived potential competition doctrine, consider the case of scare
crows. Similar to how these human-shaped objects can deceive birds from eating crops—despite
being unable to actually harm those birds—acquired firms can deter target-market firms from raising
prices despite not actually being able to enter the market. Thus, simply because an acquired firm is
not capable of entering a market does not mean it does not provide a valuable benefit worth
preserving—just like how a scarecrow is worth having although it may not actually be able to inflict
harm on birds. Proponents of the Marine Bancorporation standard may say that target-market
participants are not as naive as birds, and that the former have perfect perceptions regarding the
financial capabilities and intent of acquired firms residing “on the wings.” The FTC and DOJ have
their doubts as to if this is true, however.139 But if that is the case, then a subjective standard can
only incentivize those firms to do their research to ensure that they have every piece of necessary
information.
This anomaly underlies the difficulties courts have with this doctrine. Thus, prior to Marine
Bancorporation, the Supreme Court recognized the notion that firms do not always set prices in
accordance to what the “rational” market participant knows about potential entrants, by giving
weight to subjective evidence under the perceived potential competition theory. 140 In Marine
Bancorporation, the Court objectified this analysis, assuming they do.141 The FTC states, however,

such as Phillips into such a market on a unilateral basis would have conferred substantial competitive benefits which were
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that firms may have misjudged perceptions about potential entrants. 142 So why would the Court
impose a test that assumes they have perfect knowledge? If these target market firms are adjusting
prices in accordance to these misguided perceptions, beneficial effects may exist. Given antirust
law’s desire to keep markets competitive and prices low, we should not disrupt target market firm’s
misperceptions about potential entrants who are not actually capable of entering. In essence, an
objective standard presumes that scare crows are only useful if they are actually capable of harming
the birds that may enter a field of crops. Thus, Marine Bancorporations objective standard, which
require that acquired firms actually be capable of entering the target market, are not warranted—just
like robotic scare crows capable of injuring daring birds are not needed to preserve crops.
Lower courts have consequently struggled with the objective standard, that is, determining
whether an acquired firm has the “characteristics, capabilities and economic incentives to render it a
perceived potential entrant de novo.” This confusion has resulted in different standards across
circuits.143 Straying away from the heightened Marine Bancorporation standard, lower courts have
given varied degrees of weight to subjective perceptions. This evidence often comes in the form of
testimony from executive officials within the target market regarding their perceptions of the
acquired firm, specifically, to see whether they believe the acquired firm is one they think may enter
the target market.144 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Tenneco v. FTC found the acquired
firm to be a “perceived potential competitor” under element (i) by largely relying on the subjective
perceptions of target market participants, notwithstanding a lack of evidence which showed the
acquired firm had many of the “characteristics, capabilities, or incentives” the framework seems to
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require.145 Given the difficulty in gauging a “wings effect,”146 subjective standards of this type are
more desirable if agencies wish to preserve any economic benefits from firm perception which may
be had.
The objective standard under Marine Bancorporation, however, may speak more to a method
of proving proximate causation, rather than an unwarranted standard which only serves as a hurdle
for the FTC. Other courts, therefore, understandably require certain amounts of objective evidence,
no matter how strong the subjective evidence alludes to that fact that incumbent firms perceive the
acquired firm to be a potential entrant.147
Thus, it is argued that the perceived potential competition theory should not rest on whether
the acquired firm is actually a “potential competitor.” Rather, similar to the Second Circuit’s
approach, the focus should center on whether the acquired firm is perceived by firms in the target
market as being a “perceived potential entrant.”148 Thus, whether the acquired firm actually intends
to enter the target market should not be controlling like it is under the actual potential competition
theory for the reasons stated above.149 That being said, actual intent (e.g., public statements by the
acquired company pre-merger) to enter a market may still be relevant in deciding whether companies
in the target market are changing their behavior in response.
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V.

ANALYZING

THE

FTC

V.

STERIS CORPORATION RULING

IN THE

FACE

OF

MARINE

BANCORPORATION
This Comment now turns to an analysis of FTC v. Steris Corp. to review the court’s analysis of
the potential competition doctrine.150 Part V will first present the facts of the case. Then, it will argue
that the FTC erred by not raising the perceived potential competition theory even in light of the
Marine Bancorporation standard.

The Comment will then argue that the perceived potential

competition doctrine should be adjusted in accordance with prior precedent given the result in Steris.
A. Facts
In 2015, the FTC sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against
Steris Corp. (Steris) for its proposed merger with another leading sterilization provider, Synergy
Health PLC (Synergy).151 Steris and Synergy were the second and third largest firms in the contract
sterilization service market, which consisted of companies that contracted with manufacturers to rid
their products of unwanted microorganisms. 152 Sterigenics Corp. (Sterigenics), a third party not
involved in the proposed merger, was the largest firm by size and revenue in the relevant market. 153
At the time of the merger, the US sterilization market consisted of three methods of
sterilization: gamma radiation, e-beam radiation, and “EO” Radiation.154 Although Synergy was the
largest provider of EO facilities in the United States, it did not have any competitive presence in the
US market prior to the merger for gamma radiation services, which was the most well-regarded
method of sterilization.155 Steris and Sterigenics held eighty-five percent of US gamma facilities and
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a bulk of the US market share.156 This fact compelled Synergy founder, Dr. Richard M. Steeves, to
develop a plan which could assist Synergy in attracting gamma-using customers within the US.157
Steeves identified what he believed was an “industry trend” of companies switching from gamma to
x-ray sterilization services after a major product manufacturer engaged in this switch. 158 This
motivated Steeves to purchase Daniken Corp., a Swiss x-ray sterilization provider.159 Steeves made
the purchase with the ultimate goal of implementing commercialized x-ray sterilization in the US
market, which, according to the FTC, was a viable alternative to gamma radiation for its “possibly
superior depth of penetration and turnaround times.”160
Following the purchase of Daniken, Steeves presented his plan to the Board of Directors in
2012.161 Steeves recognized numerous issues Synergy needed to overcome for x-ray sterilization to
be successfully implemented in the United States, which consisted of: (1) building facilities within
the United States at a cost-effective price; (2) overcoming customer reluctance in switching from
gamma to x-ray radiation; and (3) securing customer commitments in the form of financial backing.162
By the fall of 2014, Synergy was successful in securing non-binding “letters of interest” from a
number of large customers.163 Synergy, however, was unable to secure any financial backing in the
form of “take-or-pay contracts,” which seemed necessary if the plan were to ultimately be
approved.164
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In October of 2014, Steris publically announced its plans to merge with Synergy.165 Despite
this development, Synergy’s x-ray plan continued “unabated” for a three-month period following the
announcement. 166 During this time, Synergy expressed optimism regarding the plan in a few
statements which were made public. 167 Specifically, Synergy announced that one of its major
customers secured “FDA approval of a Class III medical device . . . paving the way for further
conversions,” and that an exclusive agreement with a manufacturer of x-ray equipment would allow
it “to get started with x-ray in the U.S.”168 Synergy’s failure in securing customer commitments via
take-or-pay contracts continued, however, and in February of 2015, Synergy informed the FTC that
it was cancelling its x-ray plans due to this financial shortcoming.169
B. Arguments and Ruling
The FTC argued that the merger should be barred under the actual potential competition
theory—insisting that but for the transaction, Synergy, a United Kingdom-based company, would not
have discontinued its plan to compete directly for customers with Steris by introducing
commercialized x-ray sterilization services to the United States. 170 The FTC contended that the
merger barred future procompetitive benefits that would have resulted when Synergy entered the US
market—an event that the agency said was likely to occur but for the merger.171
The district court denied the FTC’s motion for preliminary injunction, finding that the FTC
“failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [the FTC] is likely to succeed on the merits
in its upcoming administrative trial.”172 Crucially, the FTC did not employ the perceived potential
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competition doctrine in arguing that the merger should be unlawful, but brought the case under only
the theory of actual potential competition.173 Thus, after preliminary hearings, the court directed the
parties to focus on one issue under the actual competition theory, that is, “whether, absent the
acquisition, the evidence shows that Synergy probably would have entered the U.S. contract
sterilization market by building one or more x-ray facilities within a reasonable period of time.”174
In addition to noting the difficulties companies would have in switching from gamma to xray sterilization,175 the driving factors behind the court’s ruling were (1) Synergy’s failure to secure
financial commitments from customers, and (2) its inability to lower capital costs involved with the
project. 176 Thus, the district court concluded that future competition between the two firms was
unlikely, based largely on the fact that the FTC failed to show that Synergy’s plan was financially
feasible and capable of being implemented in the near future.177
VI.

ANALYSIS
A. The Court’s Decision
The court viewed many of the same factors in its analysis that the Supreme Court applied in

Marine Bancorporation, specifically, when deciding whether Synergy was likely to enter the US
market. 178 The Steris court focused on objective criteria and emphasized Synergy’s financial
positioning in deciding whether it had “the available feasible means” of entry.179 Despite finding
against the government, the court seemed to apply a lower standard under the actual potential
competition theory by requiring only that the FTC show that Synergy “probably would have
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entered.”180 Thus, the court’s ruling may suggest that although it applied a lenient standard, it still
used a heightened test.181 Again, this is evident in the court’s focus on objective evidence regarding
Synergy’s financial shortcomings, rather than subjective evidence such as Synergy’s public
announcements concerning its equipment manufacturing agreement and customer interest.182
The court relied heavily on the FTC in ultimately determining to analyze only the actual
potential competition doctrine.183 Neither the court’s opinion nor supplementary documents extend
any explanation for why the FTC chose not to bring the claim on perceived potential competition
grounds.184
B. Analyzing the FTC’s Strategy
The FTC decided not to bring the perceived potential competition doctrine for reasons not
stated in the opinion.185 Therefore, it remains unclear why the agency did not attempt to also argue
that the merger should be barred because of the removal of present procompetitive effects Synergy
had on the US market. Instead, the FTC chose to argue under the actual potential competition
theory.186 This ultimately forced the FTC to argue that Synergy was likely to enter the US market—
a burden that it was unable to overcome. Before scrutinizing the FTC for not bringing the perceived
potential competition theory, it is important to analyze the framework the FTC uses to decide under
which theories to pursue the claims.
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1. Was the FTC Justified in Bringing the Claim?
The 1984 Merger Guidelines proscribes the framework agencies should follow when
determining whether to bring a claim, as well as what theories they should proffer. 187 When
determining whether to bring a claim, the Merger Guidelines employ a “single structural analysis”
when gauging mergers that present either type of harm.188 This analysis considers a list of objective
factors which the agencies use to evaluate the harmful effects a specific merger may present, and if
they are severe enough to justify a challenge to the merger. 189 These factors include: market
concentration, conditions of entry, the acquired firm’s entry advantage, the market share of the
acquiring firm, and efficiencies.190
When the analysis of those factors are taken together, the Merger Guidelines simplify their
approach into three requirements: (1) the target market must be concentrated;191 (2) entry into the
target market must not be “generally easy;” 192 and (3) the potential entrant must be uniquely
advantaged to enter the target market.193
That being said, the FTC had sound reason to bring a Section 7 claim. The US market for
contract sterilization services was essentially controlled by two firms: Steris and Sterigenics, who
together controlled an overwhelming percentage of the market.194 Thus, the first element (target
market concertation) within the FTC’s structural analysis is met without question. Since the FTC
ultimately did bring the claim, it is presumptively sound to state that it believed elements two (entry
barriers) and three (unique advantages to entry) were attainable as well—the contract sterilization
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certainly contained high entry barriers, and it can easily be argued that Synergy was uniquely
positioned to enter the target market relative to other companies.
2. Should the FTC Have Brought a Perceived Potential
Competition Claim?
After deciding to ultimately bring a claim, the Merger Guidelines then advise the agencies as
to which theory under the potential competition doctrine are most likely implicated.195 Specifically,
the Merger Guidelines recognize that both the actual and perceived potential competition theories
serve a distinct functions, which become implicated based on the positioning of the firms and the
nature of their markets.196 In describing the relationship between the two theories, the 1984 Merger
Guidelines state:
If it were always profit-maximizing for incumbent firms to set price in such a way
that all entry was deterred and if information and coordination were sufficient to
implement this strategy, harm to perceived potential competition would be the only
competitive problem to address. In practice however, actual potential competition
has independent importance. Firms already in the market may not find it optimal
to set price low enough to deter all entry; moreover, those firms may misjudge the
entry advantages of a particular firm and, therefore, the price necessary to deter its
entry.197
Thus, the Guidelines state that present procompetitive effects via lower prices are not always present
due to the misconstrued perceptions of incumbent firms.198 This fact, according to the FTC, gives
the actual potential competition theory separate and distinct importance.199
Given this section of the Guidelines, it is foreseeable that the FTC believed Steris and
Sterigenics had misconstrued perceptions of Synergy as a potential competitor, or that they just
simply did not “find it optimal to set prices low enough to deter new entry.”200 In other words, the
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agency may have not have argued under the perceived potential competition doctrine because it did
not have sufficient data that showed Synergy’s position on the edge of the market had a present
procompetitive effect on the US sterilization market.
Although the court’s opinion does not outline the conditions of the US sterilization market,
evidence does show that Synergy’s customers were interested in the idea of x-ray sterilization.201
This could lead to the conclusion that prices in the market were high to begin with.202 The stronghold
that the incumbent firms had on the market, however, along with their ability to continually raise
prices, should have been enough to bar the merger—that is, if the FTC were to balance the other
factors.
3. Should the FTC Have Argued under the Perceived Potential
Competition Theory?
Overall, the strategy of bringing only one potential competition claim is inconsistent with the
fact that agencies often employ both the actual and perceived potential competition theories when
litigating potential competition cases.203 In fact, courts have considered instances where only one
theory is addressed to be somewhat unusual. 204 Additionally, the Supreme Court has taken the
initiative multiple times in cases where only one theory was alleged, and have remanded lower court
rulings for further findings under the perceived potential competition theory.205
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The evidentiary incentives for agencies to bring a claim under both theories are substantial
since it may permit a wider range of evidence—specifically, that which concerns both the future and
present effects that a given merger has on the target market. 206 Thus, if the FTC litigated the
perceived potential competition claim, it would have been able to probe into the subjective evidence
of firms in the US market to see whether the market perceived Synergy as a likely entrant, and further,
if this perception had any present procompetitive effect on the US market. Based on the holdings in
Procter, Falstaff, and Penn-Olin, the district court in Steris could have, and arguably should have
considered whether Synergy exerted any considerable influence on the wings of the US market. These
non-binding guidelines, however, have since served as a replacement for judicial discretion—giving
administrative agencies a position of dominance when asserting guideline-based arguments in federal
courts.207
C. Could the FTC Have Succeeded under the Perceived Potential Competition Theory?
An analysis of the Steris facts using the original test given by El Paso,208 would likely lead to
the conclusion that the merger would have been barred. Again, the Supreme Court in El Paso held
that Pacific Northwest had a procompetitive impact on competition in the California market because
they were on the “wings” of that market, notwithstanding the fact that Pacific Northwest never entered
the California market, nor was it able show that it was likely to enter in the future. 209 Synergy was
similar to Pacific Northwest in many respects. Like Pacific Northwest, Synergy had financial
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shortcomings and other barriers which precluded it from immediately entering the market. 210
However, the Ohio court did not take these factors into account since the merger was viewed under
the more stringent actual potential competition theory.
The Court’s decision in Penn-Olin also addressed a multitude of factors that were not given
consideration in the Steris case due to the district court’s failure to apply the perceived potential
competition doctrine.211 Although the Court in Penn Olin did not extend a preference of any one
factor over the other, its description of the type of firm that raises antitrust concerns under the
perceived potential competition theory seems to resemble a company similar to Synergy.
Specifically, the Court in Penn-Olin stated, “the existence of an aggressive, well-equipped and well
financed corporation engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter an
oligopolistic market would be substantial incentive to competition which cannot be
underestimated.”212
The only shortcoming that the Ohio court may have found with this description concerns the
court’s finding that Synergy’s was unable to secure customer commitments and ultimately lower its
capital costs. 213 But the perceived potential competition doctrine under earlier Supreme Court
precedent did not solely rely on whether the firm had the actual financial capability to enter. 214
Synergy was also by no means a struggling firm which should not be considered “well-financed.”215
Synergy had a considerable budget of $40 million for investment purposes, 216 while being situated
as the third-largest firm in their market.217 The finding that Synergy may have not been able to
implement a complicated strategy within a short amount of time should not discredit the fact that it
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is well-financed (being the third largest company and worth over $500,000,000), aggressive
(evidenced by the fact that Steeves even entertained this plan, and coupled with the fact that he
purchased Daniken to make it feasible), engaged in a similar market (contract sterilization services),
and in an oligopolistic market (competition with Steris and Sterigenics in US market).218 Thus, the
FTC under the rationale proffered by Penn-Olin, could have—at a minimum— pursued a compelling
argument that Synergy was a perceived potential entrant.
In further applying the factors that the Court found relevant, in Penn-Olin, for gauging the
precise competitive harm, the nature of the market certainly favors the FTC’s had it employed the
perceived potential competition argument. The entire contract sterilization market was essentially
controlled by three companies: Steris, Sterigenics, and Synergy. 219 Thus, the anticompetitive harm
that results from this merger includes, that which the Court considered in Procter, in that new entrants
will be dissuaded from competing in the US market now that an already concentrated market has
become even more concentrated because of the merger between Steris and Synergy.220
In Falstaff, the Court alluded to the notion that the public announcements of interest exerted
by the acquiring firm made it likely that firms in the target market were expecting their entry, thus
changing their behavior in the market.221 In Steris, it was easily foreseeable that the plan to enter the
US market instituted by Synergy could have influenced Steris’ and Sterigenics’ market behavior in
the US. Numerous firms expressed interest in the plan, and Synergy advertised this plan to a large
audience while trying to gain customer commitments.222 Thus, it seems as if subjective evidence
regarding firm perceptions in the US market would have strongly favored the FTC, that is, if the FTC
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gave itself the chance to argue that Synergy was seen as a perceived potential entrant by firms in the
US market.
Whether the Court would have found the presence of a fringe effect is unknown. This would
depend on (1) the type of evidence that is revealed in discovery, and (2) whether the Court gives more
weight to objective or subjective evidence. Under the Marine Bancorporation standard, objective
evidence carried the day. 223 The Court in Marine Bancorporation used an objective standard
regarding what a “rational banker” with perfect information believed. 224 It ultimately came to the
conclusion that there was no present competitive effect since the rational banker most likely knew of
the barriers to entry, and therefore wouldn’t perceive the firm as a potential entrant after considering
such.225 In Steris, there were also numerous entry barriers: financing the project, customers gaining
FDA approval, getting customers to switch from gamma, and, most crucially, hoping that the
equipment manufacturers develop a machine that can support the x-ray radiation.226 Thus, if the
Court applied the Marine Bancorporation test to a tee, Steris would most likely not be found to have
a fringe effect on the market, since the prospects of effectuating its plan were ultimately slim, and
“rational” firms in the sterilization market would be assumed to be aware of all of this information.
An objective test, however, is not always applied, and it is certainly foreseeable based on lower court
rulings that the district court could have used a subjective standard.
If there were some showing of subjective evidence that could have revealed that Synergy did,
in fact, have an effect on the target market, then subjective evidence could have enabled the court to
overlook the objective evidence of Synergy’s financial capabilities. Further, if the court applied a
standard that assumed fringe effect, Synergy would not have to worry about this element altogether.227
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VII.

CONCLUSION

The court’s decision in Steris has broad implications for the legal community. On its face,
the Steris decision exemplifies how some of the largest firms in extremely concentrated industries
can avoid antitrust enforcement. Specifically, the Steris case shows how the Supreme Court’s failure
to use a subjective test under the perceived potential competition doctrine, like the Second Circuit’s,
has possibly influenced enforcement agencies to not bring their case under the theory at all. This
phenomenon is not only historically unusual, but also concerning for antitrust agencies who may feel
compelled to now bring cases under the more stringent actual potential competition theory. If a trend
away from concentration is what antitrust law and their enforcement agencies most desire, then a
change in the guidelines should correct for Marine Bancorporation’s evidentiary hurdles under the
potential competition doctrine.

small number of other potential entrants, the feasibility of unilateral entry by Phillips, and the concentrated nature of the
market are legally sufficient to establish that Phillips’ entry into the market through the Tidewater acquisition had
substantial anticompetitive effects. It must necessarily be assumed that the entry of an aggressive major company such
as Phillips into such a market on a unilateral basis would have conferred substantial competitive benefits which were lost
when it was allowed to step into the shoes of an established major factor in the market. The substantiality of the
anticompetitive effects of the Tidewater acquisition may be inferred from the objective facts present here.”).
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